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ESSAY
THE LINE-ITEM VETO AMENDMENT
J. Gregory Sidakt
One of the first orders of business for the 104th Congress was to
introduce bills and proposed constitutional amendments that give the
President a line-item veto. During the first two weeks ofJanuary 1995,
proposed constitutional amendments were introduced by Senators
Brown,' Thurmond,2 and Simon.3 Meanwhile, Senator Dole intro-
duced S. 4, the Legislative Line Item Veto Act of 1995.4 In this Essay, I
first provide two arguments why, if Congress wants the President to
have a line-item veto, a constitutional amendment is superior to a stat-
ute as the means of conferring that power on the Executive. I then
explain how other constitutional provisions would implicitly limit the
President's power under a line-item veto amendment.
I
THE DuRABILTry OF REFORM
The debate over granting the President a line-item veto, like the
debate over enacting a balanced-budget amendment, is usually cast in
terms of a redefinition of the balance of power between the President
and Congress. This portrayal, symptomatic of the inward focus of
much policy debate in Washington, fails to appreciate that the larger
issue posed by the line-item veto is intergenerational equity.
5
The absence of a presidential line-item veto may have contrib-
uted to the seemingly irreversible growth of the federal government.
When spending enlarges the government's debt, the government in
effect shifts the obligation to pay for current programs to future gen-
t F.KL Weyerhaeuser Fellow in Law and Economics, American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research; Senior Lecturer, Yale School of Management. This Essay is based
on testimony given to the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee on January 24, 1995. I thank Christopher C. DeMuth, Paul W. MacAvoy, Allan H.
Meltzer, and Melinda Ledden Sidak for helpful comments.
1 SJ. Res. 16, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 CONG. REc. S900 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1995).
2 SJ. Res. 2, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 CONG. REc. S412 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995).
3 SJ. Res. 15, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 CONG. REc. S806 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 1995).
4 S. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 CONG. REc. S97 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995).
5 Legal scholars have devoted remarkably little attention to issues of intergenera-
tional equity outside the field of environmental regulation. For a notable exception, see
Thomas A. Smith, A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 104 YALE Lj. 367
(1994).
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erations, who by definition cannot vote today against the adoption of
such programs. Moreover, if current government expenditures are
made to finance present consumption rather than consumption over
an extended period of time (as in the case of investment in a long-
lived asset, such as an interstate highway), then current federal budget
deficits represent a transfer of wealth from future generations of
American taxpayers to subsidize the consumption of the current gen-
eration. 6 Government debt incurred to fund current consumption is
a "negative bequest" to future generations.
Viewed in these terms, constitutional reforms like the balanced-
budget amendment and the line-item veto are not mere structural
modifications of the operation of the federal government. Rather,
these reforms protect the liberty and property of future generations of
American citizens. Therefore, one should regard the collection of
constitutional amendments that would effect such fiscal reforms as the
current generation's constitutional commitment not to employ the
taxing and spending powers of the federal government to expropriate
the property of future generations.
How credible is that commitment? Economic theory recognizes
that commitments made in bargaining situations influence the behav-
ior of other actors only to the extent that the person making such
commitments is credibly bound (by himself or others) to honor
them.7 A statute and a constitutional amendment differ vastly in their
likely efficacy in protecting future generations. What is to prevent the
105th Congress from enacting appropriations bills in 1997 that begin
with the clause, "Notwithstanding any provision of the Legislative Line
Item Veto Act of 1995"? Because the proposed legislation would be
no more than an act of Congress, it could be made inapplicable to any
piece of legislation that either the 104th Congress or a subsequent
Congress desired.
An analogy is useful. Academicians have discussed the limits on
one Congress's ability to commit future Congresses that arise under
section 8(a) of the War Powers Resolution, which specifies the requi-
site form of congressional authorization of the President's use of mili-
tary force 8-the statute being incapable of amending the War Clause 9
6 See, e.g., Alex Cukierman & Allan H. Meltzer, A Political Theory of Government Debt
and Dofcits in a Neo-Ricardian Framework, 79 Am. ECON. REv. 713 (1989).
7 See, e.g., PAUL MILGROM &JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGE-
MENT 130-31 (1992); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 22-28 (1960); OLI-
VER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPrrALISM 167 (1985).
8 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a) (1) (1988).
9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
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or the Commander-in-Chief Clause' 0 of the Constitution." Perhaps
more to the point, the 99th Congress that enacted the Gramm-Rud-
man-Hollings Act' 2 in 1985 could not bind subsequent Congresses to
abide by the deficit-reduction framework of that bipartisan legislation.
Given these analogies, it is not clear why the American electorate
should have any greater reason to believe in the durability-and
hence the efficacy-of a statute purporting to give the President a
line-item veto. The 104th Congress simply cannot credibly commit
future Congresses to forbear from exercising their discretion to re-
peal, suspend, or otherwise circumscribe line-item veto authority con-
ferred to the President by statute. Even if voters at large would not
realize this to be the state of affairs, surely the international financial
community would recognize immediately that the statute could not
credibly commit future Congresses. The financial markets in New
York, London, Tokyo, and Frankfurt would accordingly discount the
likelihood that the line-item veto could serve any useful purpose in
preventing logrolling, reducing federal spending, or reducing the
debt of the United States government.
II
AVERTING CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION
One would presume that the 104th Congress is currently consid-
ering constitutional amendments and proposed legislation to create a
line-item veto because the Legislature actually wishes the President to
be able to exercise such authority in the near future. A statute pur-
porting to give the President a line-item veto, however, would immedi-
ately be challenged in court as a violation of the Presentment
Clause.' 3
The dispute might not necessarily arise only between a congres-
sional opponent of the line-item veto and the President; a private citi-
zen affected by the veto of a line item of federal spending also might
sue. By analogy, riders in appropriations bills that prohibit, for the
fiscal year, certain items of spending by the Executive Branch or an
independent agency have given rise to private litigation.14 Litigation
would shroud the statutory line-item veto in legal uncertainty for years
and thus ensure that a President would refrain from vigorously using
this authority until the litigation was resolved.
10 Id., art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
11 CompareJoHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILrIY 128-30 (1993) andJohn Hart Ely,
Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1379, 1418-19
(1988), withj. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DuKE LJ. 27, 110-13 (1991).
12 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177,
99 Stat. 1038 (1985).
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, §7, ci. 2. See also iid. at cI. 3.
14 E.g., News Am. Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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The desire to avert protracted litigation, however, is not the dis-
positive reason for Congress to choose a constitutional amendment
over a statute. The more important reason is that the Supreme Court
would likely rule that a line-item veto statute, if it truly conferred new
powers on the President, is unconstitutional. The Court would have
to consider whether Congress has the power, under the Necessary and
Proper Clause' 5 and possibly under other textual provisions, to give
the President greater discretion to veto legislation than the text of the
Presentment Clause currently provides.
Ironically, a line-item veto purportedly conferred by statute is
likely to survive attack on Presentment Clause grounds only if it creates
no legal authority that the President does not already possess under
the Constitution. The Court might conclude, as I have previously ar-
gued,' 6 that Article I, section 7, clauses 2 and 3 already confer on the
President the implicit power to exercise an itemized veto over individ-
ual bills, orders, resolutions, or votes requiring the concurrence of the
House and Senate. In such a case, the line-item veto statute would
have the same legal force as a statute giving the President the power to
nominate Justices to the Supreme Court or to command the armed
forces. Because the Constitution already confers such power on the
President, a statute purporting to do so would be nothing more than
an innocuous, if presumptuous, curiosity.
Given the probable constitutional infirmity of a line-item veto
statute, it would be better for Congress to pass ajoint resolution urg-
ing the President to exercise an "inherent" line-item veto and thereby
create a test case for the Supreme Court to resolve. Senator Dole
made this proposal in 198917 and Senator Specter made it in January
1995.18
If the President does not already have an inherent line-item veto,
and thus if a line-item veto statute purported to give him powers that
he does not now possess, then litigation over that statute would pres-
ent the question of whether Congress had unlawfully delegated its leg-
islative powers to the Executive. That question would raise significant
issues under the separation of powers doctrine.
Conventionally, nonconsensual transfers (or diminutions) of con-
stitutional responsibilities are thought to violate the principle of sepa-
ration of powers. These transfers, embodying "the encroaching spirit
15 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
16 The Line Item Veto and the Constitution: Hearings before the Subcomm. on the Constitution
of the Sen. Judiciary Comm., 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (June 15, 1994) (statement of J. Gregory
Sidak);J. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Four Faces of the Item Veto: A Reply to Tribe and
Kurland, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 437 (1990); see alsoJ. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Why
Did President Bush Repudiate the -Inherent" Line-Item Veto?, 9J.L. & POL. 39 (1992).
17 Robert Dole, Bush Can Draw the Line, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 1989, at A21.
18 141 CONG. REc. S179 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995).
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of power" of which Madison spoke, 19 evoke analogies to trespass, mis-
appropriation, or monopolization: One branch usurps the preroga-
tives initially assigned to another,20 or interferes with the other
branch's ability to discharge duties or exercise prerogatives that the
Constitution textually assigns to it.21 The result is, in Madison's words,
a "gradual concentration of the several powers in the same depart-
ment."22 When Congress commits such a usurpation, one common
symptom is the enactment, by override of a veto, of a "framework"
statute redefining the allocation of critical decisionmaking responsi-
bility between Congress and the President. Framework statutes en-
acted by congressional override include two notorious laws of
enduring controversy-the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act 23 and the War Powers Resolution.24
The separation of powers can be violated in another way that is
more relevant to the constitutionality of a line-item veto statute: The
Executive and the Legislature can agree to exchange or commingle
their duties and prerogatives. The Constitution assigns duties and
prerogatives concerning different governmental functions-such as
making new laws, judging cases, and executing the existing laws. As in
private life, public actors will bargain around legal rules or property
rights in creative ways to reach desired results.25 Obviously, any bill
that the President signs into law may be considered the result of vol-
untary exchange between the Executive and Legislative Branches.
However, by making formality an element of political legitimacy, the
Framers raised the costs of deciding political questions through
means other than the highly visible processes textually specified in the
Constitution, such as the process envisioned by the Presentment
Clause.2 6 This formality discourages ad hoc bargains between the
branches and makes it more likely that a given political decision ulti-
mately will be made through the process and by the actors originally
prescribed by the Framers. As Justice Scalia has noted, "the Constitu-
tion guarantees not merely that no Branch will be forced by one of
19 THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 332, 333 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
20 See Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991); Metropolitan Wash. Air-
ports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252, 274 (1991); Com-
modity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856 (1986); Bowsher v. Synar, 478
U.S. 714, 722 (1986).
21 SeeMorrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988). On the trespass analogy, see Geof-
frey P. Miller, Rights and Structure in Constitutional Theory, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y, Spring 1991,
at 196, 201-02; J. Gregory Sidak, The Inverse Coase Theorem and Declarations of War, 41 DuKE
L.J. 325, 327 (1991). On the monopoly analogy, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALY
Sis OF LAW 618-19 (4th ed. 1992).
22 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 347, 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
23 Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (1974) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 601-688).
24 Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548).
25 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
26 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983).
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the other Branches to let someone else exercise its assigned powers-
but that none of the Branches will itself alienate its assigned powers." 27
A line-item veto statute would be highly vulnerable to this type of con-
stitutional attack.
Congress could avoid the controversy of constitutional litigation,
and the attendant delay in the President's use of the line-item veto, by
conferring such authority by a constitutional amendment rather than
by a statute. To be sure, even a line-item veto amendment may pres-
ent disputes necessitating the Supreme Court's interpretation.
Although we cannot anticipate the nature of all such disputes, one is
entirely foreseeable: Are cases arising under the line-item veto
amendment nonjusticiable "political questions," or are they legal
questions that the Judiciary is empowered to decide?28 The more
Congress can say about justiciability now, the greater the certainty it
can create concerning the functioning of the President's line-item
veto, if and when the states ratify the amendment.
III
IMPLICIT LIMITS ON A LINE-ITEM VETO AMENDMENT
It should go without saying that the President could not exercise
the line-item veto in a manner that would prevent Congress from dis-
charging the duties or exercising the prerogatives that Article I textu-
ally assigns to it. An analogous argument is now recognized with
regard to Congress using its appropriations power to deny the Presi-
dent funding to perform the duties and exercise the prerogatives that
Article II textually assigns to him.2 9 The same reasoning should apply
to the greater powers over fiscal affairs that the President would exer-
cise after the ratification of a line-item veto amendment.
As an extreme example, the President could not wield his line-
item veto power to deny Congress the funding necessary to convene
and conduct business, for this action would violate Congress's duty to
"assemble at least once in every Year."30 Nor, obviously, could the
President line-item veto the payment of salaries to members of Con-
gress.31 Senator Simon may have had such concerns in mind when
27 Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 956 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28 See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962).
29 J. Gregory Sidak, The President's Power of the Purse, 1989 DuKE LJ. 1162, 1213-14;J.
Gregory Sidak, The Recommendation Claus4 77 GEO. LJ. 2079, 2100-03 (1989); J. Gregory
Sidak, Spending Riders Would Unhorse the Executive, WAU.L ST.J., Nov. 2, 1989, atA18. Accord,
Jay S. Bybee, Advising the President: Separation of Powers and the Federal Advisory Committee Act,
104 YALE L.J. 51, 113-14 (1994).
30 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2.
31 See id., § 6, cl. 1 ("The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation




providing, in his proposed constitutional amendment, that the Presi-
dent's line-item veto would not extend to "any item of appropriation
for the Congress."
3 2
Senator Simon's language, however, could sweep too broadly. For
example, it could be read to preclude the President from reducing
the appropriations for a new congressional office building that he re-
garded as extravagant or unnecessary. Congress could avoid future
controversy on this point by, instead of adopting Senator Simon's
broad language, stating explicitly in the amendment that the Presi-
dent could not deny Congress the funding necessary for it to dis-
charge the duties and exercise the prerogatives that Article I textually
assigns to the Legislative Branch.
Likewise, the President could not defund the Judiciary's ability to
discharge the duties or exercise the prerogatives that Article III textu-
ally assigns to it. For example, the President clearly could not use the
line-item veto to reduce the salaries of federal judges.3 3 Moreover, in
some instances, the Judiciary's right to be funded might flow from
textual provisions outside Article III. For example, the President
surely could not deny the funding necessary for the Chief Justice to
preside over that President's impeachment trial in the Senate, as Arti-
cle I provides.3 4
CONCLUSION
Some individuals consider it radical to amend the Constitution to
mandate a balanced budget or to give the President a line-item veto.
That view is curious. The Constitution of 1787 obviously had its weak-
nesses.3 5 Moreover, the Framers expressly provided in Article V two
separate means of amending the Constitution.36 With few exceptions,
the Framers did not attempt to foreclose subsequent generations from
adopting particular policies; rather, they created a process of
supermajority votes in both houses of Congress and among the states
to enable the people to decide whether or not a particular constitu-
tional amendment would serve the common good. It is hard to take
seriously the advice that Congress should avoid the solemn business of
amending the Constitution when those dispensing such advice are
content to have an unelected Judiciary interpret a "living" or "unwrit-
32 SJ. Res. 15, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 141 CONG. REC. S806 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 1995).
33 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("TheJudges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts ....
shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be dimin-
ished during their Continuance in Office.").
34 Id, art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
35 Common examples include the continuation of slavery, the counting of a slave as
three-fifths of a person, and the absence of the vote for women.
36 U.S. CoNsr. art. V.
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ten" Constitution to grant new rights where its text is silent and oblit-
erate old rights where its text is manifest.37
The line-item veto is a reform that will restore equity across gen-
erations of American taxpayers by reducing the likelihood that the
federal government will set a current level of public consumption that
diminishes the standard of living of future citizens. If the experiment
with the line-item veto fails, Article V provides the formal means to
reverse course. But to conduct a fair test of whether the line-item veto
can restore fiscal responsibility to the federal government, Congress
must confer that power on the President by constitutional amend-
ment rather than by statute. The line-item veto will be credible only if
Congress cannot withdraw it whenever doing so would suit the Legisla-
ture's ephemeral purposes.
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